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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ANNOTATED WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By FRANK MURRAY**

Chapter 7
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND DELEGATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OR CONDITIONS
SECTION

148.

Scope of Chapter. Definitions peculiar 'to the Chapter.

149. Definition of assignment, assignor and assignee.
150. Definition of effective assignment.
151. What rights can be effectively assigned.
152. When an obligor must perform to an assignee instead of to the
original obligee.
153. A joint obligee may effectively assign.

Section 148. Scope of Chapter. Definitions Peculiar to the
Chapter.
(1) The statements in this Chapter are qualified with reference to rights and duties under negotiable instruments or conveyances of land, by the special rules of law governing negotiable instruments, and by the rules of the law of property creating rights in or imposing duties on a person because he has
acquired an interest in land.
(2) In this Chapter,
(a) "Right" includes all rights arising under contracts or
for breaches of contract, and only such rights;
(b) "Obligor" means a person subject to a contractual
duty or liable for breach of a contract;
(c) "Obligee" means the original owner of a right.
* This is a continuation of the Kentucky Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts. The work is being done by Professor Frank
Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky in cooperation
with the Kentucky State Bar Association.
** Frank Murray, A. B., Univ. of Montana; LL. B. 1925, Univ. of
Montana; S. J. D. 1930, Harvard Univ.; Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of
Montana School of Law, 1928-29; Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kentucky College of Law since 1930.*
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Comment on Subsection (1) :
a. Negotiable instruments are excluded from the Restatement in this Chapter because the rules governing them are to
some extent different from those governing the assignment of
non-negotiable contractual rights. Negotiable instruments are
treated as a separate Subject of Restatement. For a similar
reason a statement of the benefits and burdens attached to successive owners of property because of a contract in a prior conveyance or lease is omitted. The law on thd subject grew up as
part of the law governing realty and is included in the Restatement of that Subject.
Annotation:
Although the following sections are not always applicable to
the transfer of negotiable instruments and are not intended to include
such, many Kentucky cases, involving what are now negotiable instruments and arising before 1904, are, and may properly be, cited under
the appropriate sections since before that time (the date of the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act) bonds, bills, and notes
were assignable but lacked the chief characteristic of negotiability in
that any assignee took subject to existing set-offs and defenses-Richie
v. Crafle, 108 Ky. 483, 56 S. W. 963; Pranther v. Weissiger, 73 Ky
(10 Bush) 117. This was due to a statute enacted in 1798 which made
bonds, bills and notes assignable at law and specifically provided for
the allowance of discounts and defenses. Later an exception was
made abolishing defenses to bills of exchange. This statute with the

exception now appears as Section 474 of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes.
An exception was also made by the enactment in 1865 (now K. S.
Sec. 483) which placed notes payable to or discounted at any bank in
the Commonwealth on the footing of foreign bills of exchange.

Section 149.

Definition of Assignment, Assignor, and

Assignee.
(1) An "assignment" of a right is a manifestation to another person by the owner of the right indicating his intention
to transfer, without further action or manifestation of intention, the right to such other person or to a third person.
(2) An "assignor" is a person who assigns a right, whether
or not he is the original owner thereof.
(3) An "assignee" is a person to whom a right is assigned,
whether or not the assignor is the original owner thereof.
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(4) A "sub-assignee" is an assignee to whom a right is
assigned by one -who is himself a previous assignee thereof.
(5) An "assignment for value" is one given
(a) for a consideration that would be sufficient for an in'formal contract, or
(b) as security for the satisfaction of a right then enforceable, or
(c) as security for the satisfaction of a right -which would
be then enforceable if it were not for the operation of
a Statute of Limitations, of Bankruptcy or of Frauds,
or
(d) as security for a right which the assignee, induced by
the assignment, thereafter acquires.
(6) An assignee under an assignment given for value is an
assignee for value. Any other assignment or assignee is a gratuitous assignment or assignee.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. By the terms of this definition only such transfers of
rights are included as take place by virtue of a manifestation of
intention by the assignor to the assignee, or to another person on
his behalf. Transfers of rights by operation of law without such
a manifestation, as in transfers by virtue of his office to an executor, administrator, trustee in bankruptcy or receiver, are not
included.
Annotation:
The definitions here given have been approved, or at least are not
at variance with the definitions used by our Courts with the exceptions
noted.
Statements in some of our decisions follow closely the definition
of assignment given here and all insist on the intention and manifestation thereof. In Lexington Brewing Co. v. Hamon, 155 Ky. 711,
160 S. W. 264, it is said, "No particular form of words is necessary
*

.

. for it is sufficient if there is a verbal declaration whereby the

intention to part with the ownership of the chose is properly manifested."
This section defines an "assignment" as distinct from an "effective
assignment" while our Courts generally classify as assignments only
those manifestations which are effective in transferring legal (in-
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cluding equitable) rights. Our definitions are generally based on the
result rather than on the operative facts. See annotations of Section 150.
In so far as the test of an "assignment for value" is its irrevocability (Section 158), or its priority over an attachment by creditors
(Section 172), or priority over a subsequent assignment (Section
173-2) we have followed subsection (5).
(a). This includes payment of money, transfer of property or
promises to do these things and is the usual "value" given.
(b) An assignment given as security for a right then enforceable
is an assignment for value--Rich v. Swetman, 15 K. L. R. 602 (holding
assignee's right superior to that of an attaching creditor of assignor);
Henderson National Bank v. Lagow, 3 K. L. R. 173; Wilkens v. Usher,
123 Ky. 696, 97 S. W. 37; Talbott v. Cook, 23 Ky. (7 T. B. Mon.) 438.
But see Shuster v. Jones, 22 K. L. R. 568, 58 S. W. 595.
(c) As security of a right that would be enforceable if it were
not for Statute of Limitations, of Bankruptcy or of Frauds-McCormac
v. Smith, 19 Ky. (3 T. B. Mon.) 429, 433.
Security for an obligation which the assignee, induced by
(d)
the assignment, thereafter contracts-Newby v. Hill, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.)
530.

Section 150. Definition of Effective Assignment.
(1) An "effective assignment" is one by which the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is extinguished and the
assignee acquires a right to such performance.
(2)

An assignment is not ineffective because it is condi-

tional, revocable or voidable by the assignor for lack of consideration or for other reason, or because it is within the provisions

of a Statute of Frauds.
Annotation:
Our definitions of an "assignment" are to be understood as generally meaning an "effctive assignment" and substantially follow the
definition here given in insisting on the extinguishment of the right
of the assignor and the acquisition of the right by the assignee. "The
true test of what constitutes an assignment is whether the debtor
would be justified in paying the debt to the one claiming to be the
assignee"-Marshall'sCreditors v. Marshall's Estate, 227 Ky. 764, 768,
14 S. W. (2d) 168. "Any order, writing or act which makes an appropriation of a debt or fund amounts to an equitable assignment"Philadelphia Veneer & Lbr. Co. v. Garrison, 160 Ky. 329, 335, 164
S. W. 714; Lexington Brewing Co. v. Hamon, 155 Ky. 711, 716, 160
S. W. 264; Newby v. Hill, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 530. It is this "appropriation" or right to control the chose which distinguishes an effective
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assignment from a promise to pay out of a particular fund and similar
transactions. See Peoples Bank v. Barbour, 14 K. L. R. 98, 19 S. W.
585; Marshall v. Strange, 10 K. L. R. 410, 9 S. W. 250; Little v. Berry,
113 S. W. 902; R. C. Poage Milling Go. v. Economy Fuel Company, 128
S. W. 311 (although the assignor also agrees to collect and pay over).
Subsection (2) is in accord with the Kentucky decisions. A.
debtor cannot object that the assignment is revocable for lack of
consideration--Jones' Admr. v. Moore, 102 Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126;
Henderson Nat. Bank v. Lagow, 3 K. L. R. 173.

Sectifn 151. What Rights Can Be Effectively Assigned.
A right may be subject of effective assignment unless,
(a) the substitution of a right of the assignee for the right
of the assignor would vary materially the duty of the
obligor, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed upon him by his contract, or impair materially
his chance of obtaining return performance, or
(b) the assignment is forbidden by statute or by the policy
of the common law, or
(e) the assignment is prohibited by the contract creating
the right.
Annotation:
The statute of 1789, substantially the same as Section 474 of our
present codification, made bonds, bills and notes assignable. This
statute not only retarded the application and development of the law
of negotiability (see the annotation under Section 148, supra) but
it had the further effect of strictly limiting assignments at law. Our
so-called "real party in Interest statute", effective in 1861, did not correct this since it provided that "when the assignment is not authorized
by statute the assignor must be a party, as plaintiff or defendant".
This distinction between statutory and non-statutory assignments still.
exists (Carroll's Kentucky Codes, 1931, Section 19). Also see the
cases collected by Dean Evans in 18 Ky. Law Journal 242-6. The statement that certain rights are not assignable at law does not mean that
the interest of the assignee is not recognized and protected as it would
be elsewhere since the distinction between legal and equitable assignments is a matter of procedure and not of substantive law-Shaw v.
McKnight Keaton Groc. Co., 231 Ky. 223, 21 S. W. (2d) 269; Builders
Duntile Co. v. Dunn Mfg. Go., 229 Ky. 569, 17 S. W. (2d) 715. Recent
decisions indicate a tendency to disregard the distinction. In a suit
on a non-statutory (equitable) assignment, the non-joinder of the assignor in the petition is not necessarily fatal since the defect Is cured
if he becomes a party at any time before judgment--Coumbus Mining
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Co. v. Combs, 233 Ky. 476, 26 S. W. (2d) 26-or the defect may be
cured where no demurrer is filed and the assignor, by his own testimony, establishes the assignment and thus binds himself by the judgment-Dejarnett v. Tutt, 230 Ky. 99, 18 S. W. (2d) 968.
The Kentucky decisions agree with the implication of this section
that, as a general rule, a right is assignable, and that non-assignability
is an exception to be established by special facts. It is said, "a contract is generally assignable unless forbidden by public policy, or the
contract itself, or its provisions are such as to show that one of the
parties reposes a personal confidence in the other which he would
have been unwilling to impose in any other person"-Pulaski Stave
Co. v. Miller, 138 Ky. 372, 128 S. W. 96; EnterpriseMfg. Co. v. Taubee,
152 Ky. 783, 154 S. W. 27. It is true that our Courts speak of "contracts" being assignable or non-assignable, but, where it is matoria
the distinction between the assignment of rights and the delegatio of
duties (Sec. 160, infra) is recognized and rights, even under pers nal
service contracts, are held to be assignable-F. Haag & Bros.\ v.
Riechart, 242 Ky. 298, 134 S. W. 191; Armstrong Mfg. Co. v. Gardner,
209 Ky. 93, 272 S. W. 22.
(a)
"One who has contracted to render personal services cannot
transfer the claim for such services . . . so as in any degree to limit
the free action of the employer in regard to the work to be done"-Hazel & Co. v. Mcloskey, 6 K. L. R. 736; Sparks v. Htmphill, 8 Ky.
Opin. 543 (a right to receive board at a certain price under a contract
is not assignable).
(b) The assignment of wages except to banks is prohibited by
K. S. 4758a if for a period longer than 90 days after the assignment,
nor then unless a prescribed form is followed. The assignment of unearned wages by public officers is also prohibited by the policy of the
common law-Jones v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 357 (by
sheriff); Trimble v. Ford, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 519 (dictum as to all civil
and military salaries); Field v. Chipley, 79 Ky. 260 (Clerk of Court);
Dickinson v. Johnson, 110 Ky. 236, 61 S. W. 267 (dictum as to Clerk
of Court); Holt v. Thurman, 111 Ky. 84, 63 S. W. 280 (City Attorney);
Schmitt v. Dooling, 145 Ky. 240, 140 S. W. 197 (Fireman. The case
is valuable in that it defines "public officer" as used above). However,
wages that have been earned by a public officer may then be assignedOberdorgerv. Louisville School Board, 120 Ky. 112, 85 S. W. 696. The
assignment of federal pensions, if not prohibited by statute, would be
against public policy and void-Trimble v. Ford, supra.
(c) A prohibition in the contract may prevent an assignment of
rights. The terms of the contract may limit the rights to the period
of exercise by the original parties-Frankfort & C. Raj. Co. v. Jackson,
153 Ky. 534, 156 S. W. 103. However, in view of constitutional and
statutory provisions, even an express prohibition of the transfer of wage
coupons will not prevent their assignment-Pond Creek Coal Co. v.
Lester, 171 Ky. 811, 188 S. W. 907; Ashless Coal Co. v. Davis, 183 Ky.

K. L. 3.-ll
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406, 209 S. W. 532. The words, "not negotiable" will not prevent the
assignment of rights-ArmstrongMfg. Co. v. Gardner, 209 Ky. 93, 272
S. W. 22. (Seemingly this contract was also "not transferable").
For other cases dealing with the effect of a clause prohibiting the
assignment of rights under the contract, or one prescribing the method
of assignment see the annotations to Section 176, infra.

Section 152. When An Obligor Must Perform to An Assignee Instead of to the Original Obligee.
(1)

If the performance which an obligor is under a duty

to render involves co-operative action by the obligee of such a
nature that the obligee has power to delegate the action to an

agent, an effective assignment of the obligee's right subjects the
obligor to a duty to perform with the co-operation of the assignee
instead of that of the obligee.
(2) The performance that an obligor is under a duty to

render can be changed by assignment of the obligee's right only
as stated in Subsection (1)

and in slight and unimportant de-

tails.
Annotation:
In the following case, the assignee was held entitled to performance by the obligor although it involved co-operative action: Halbert
v. Deering, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 9 (where the obligor was to make pumps
from material furnished by the obligee-assignor).
In the following cases it was held that the obligor was under no
duty to act with the co-operation of the assignee: Beard v. Beard, 200
Ky. 4, 254 S. W. 430 (Under a contract providing for a home with a
son, a mother is not b6und to accept and pay for a home with her
daughter-in-law); Davenport v. Gentry, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 427 (An
apprentice is not bound to serve the assignee of the master); Schultz
Co. v. Johnson's Admr., 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 497 (Where the contract
is to pay the obligee for hemp "of his own raising" the obligor is not
bound to accept and pay an assignee for hemp of his raising). The
doctrine of Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden, 127 U. S. 379
(which appears as illustration 4 of this section) is approved in Pulaski
Stave Co. v. Miller Creek Lbr. Co., 138 Ky. 372, 128 S. W. 96, but not
applied because assent bound the obligor to act.

Section 153. A Joint Obligee May Effectively Assign.
A joint obligee may effectively assign his interest in the
joint right, but the assignee can enforce the right against the

A. L. I.
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obligor only by joining the other obligees in an -action against
the obligor.
Annotation:
Today we would recognize an assignment by a joint obligee [but
see Hubbard v. Pranther, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb 178] and require the joining
of the other obligees in a suit against the obligor-Roberts v. Elliott,
19 Ky. (3 T. B. Mon.) 395-but we probably go further, even in an
assignment that would normally come under our statute except bills
of exchange and consider it as an equitable assignment requiring that
the assignor or assignors be joined-Snelling v. Boyd, 21 Ky. (5 T. B.
Mon.) 172. This is also true in a suit to enforce the liability of an
assignor by a subsequent assignee-Mardis v. Tyler, 49 Ky. (10 B.
Mon.) 376.
(To Be Continued)
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JUDGE SMITH HICKENLOOPER
Memorial services for the late Judge Smith Hickenlooper
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth District
were held in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals Wednesday, November 7, at 9 a.m. Judge Charles H. Moorman presided, with Judges Xenophon Hicks, Charles 0. Simons and
Florence Allen occupying the bench with him.

